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Introduction
Abstract

Comparative constitutional law is today an exciting and increasingly diverse field of academic inquiry in US
and Canadian law schools, as the excellent papers for this Symposium illustrate. Looking back, the 1990s were
also a dynamic period for comparative constitutional law, with a predictable emphasis on constitution drafting
in Eastern Europe and South Africa. As law and economics and empirical work became popular tools of legal
analysis, comparative constitutional law initially drifted instead toward a focus on constitutional courts and on
positive and negative liberties. Moreover, once the focus shifted away from active constitution drafting
projects, questions re-surfaced about why we should compare constitutions and, in turn, about how they
should be compared. Today, the field appears to have put this existential anxiety aside. Recent work is
methodologically diverse with a strong focus on empirical analysis. The empirical focus is complemented by
sophisticated work on informal or unwritten norms, a theme that runs through the contributions to this
Symposium. Geographic diversity is becoming somewhat less challenging—at least superficially—due in part
to a growth of resources available in English. The field is also diversifying in terms
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INTRODUCTION
INGRID B. WUERTH*
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS TODAY an exciting and increasingly

diverse field of academic inquiry in US and Canadian law schools, as the
excellent papers for this Symposium illustrate. Looking back, the 1990s were also
a dynamic period for comparative constitutional law, with a predictable emphasis
on constitution drafting in Eastern Europe and South Africa. As law and
economics and empirical work became popular tools of legal analysis, comparative
constitutional law initially drifted instead toward a focus on constitutional courts
and on positive and negative liberties. Moreover, once the focus shifted away
from active constitution drafting projects, questions re-surfaced about why we
should compare constitutions and, in turn, about how they should be compared.
Today, the field appears to have put this existential anxiety aside. Recent work is
methodologically diverse with a strong focus on empirical analysis. The empirical
focus is complemented by sophisticated work on informal or unwritten norms,
a theme that runs through the contributions to this Symposium. Geographic
diversity is becoming somewhat less challenging—at least superficially—due in
part to a growth of resources available in English. The field is also diversifying
in terms of the topics studied, including an increasing overlap in comparative
inquiry in private, public, and even international law. As a group, the four
contributions to this Symposium illustrate the methodological, topical, and
geographic diversity of the field.
The contribution by Richard Albert focuses on unwritten rules or
“conventions” of constitutional amendment, a topic he has addressed in an
important corpus of work on amendments and on the Canadian Constitution. In
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this article—which is not explicitly “comparative”—he considers whether there is
an unwritten convention that requires a national referendum in order to amend
the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. The primary basis for such
a convention is the failed Charlottetown Accord, which would have changed
the position of Quebec within the Canadian constitutional system. Although
not required to do so, political actors submitted the Charlottetown Accord to a
non-binding national referendum. Canadians voted down the Accord and the
proposed amendments were dropped. Albert explores whether these events are
merely a precedent or whether they have become an unwritten convention of
federal referendal consultation. Applying the reasoning from Canadian cases
and from scholars, Albert concludes that, on balance, there is not (yet) such a
convention, although perhaps future actions by politicians will show that one
has developed. Albert concludes with the concern that such a convention would
make it even harder to amend the Canadian Constitution and with the suggestion
that an alternative method of constitutional amendment be developed through
convention. These observations provide the platform from which the Canadian
Constitution might be compared with others.
Francesca Bignami makes a methodological contribution to the Symposium.
Like Albert’s article, hers points to aspects of constitutionalism that are difficult
to capture empirically. She argues that, in the post-Cold War period, convergence
in the world’s constitutional systems (in part around democracy) has made it
easier to compare constitutions, at least as a formal matter. But comparing the
written terms of constitutions—what Bignami calls formalism—may overlook
the different social and legal contexts in which those written terms actually
function. She argues that more comparative constitutional scholarship should
take a “functionalist” approach to comparisons by focusing on a particular social
problem and asking how different legal systems resolve it. Empirical scholarship
has taken the field in the opposite direction, however. As an example, the legal
oversight of social and economic policy-making is performed in Germany by
constitutional courts, while in France and the United States it is more often part
of administrative law. Bignami’s contribution draws its methodology from private
comparative law—illustrating the ways that comparative constitutional law is
diversifying methodologically—while also illustrating the field’s topical diversity
by addressing administrative law and regulation as an aspect of comparative
constitutional law.
The article for this Symposium authored by Mohammad Fadel addresses
recent constitutional change in Egypt, highlighting the (hopefully) increasingly
diverse geographic ambit of comparative constitutional law. Fadel’s contribution
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also underscores the importance of intellectual and religious history to the
understanding of contemporary events—in this case, the importance of historical
Islamic political thought to recent events in Egypt. Fadel argues that Egypt is
witnessing not so much a battle between a secular and a theocratic society, but
instead between conflicting kinds of theocracy. An ideal Islamic constitutional
order requires that the state protect religious orthodoxy and its representative
capacity. Today, however, political circumstances are such that a representative
state undermines religious orthodoxy, creating a multiplicity of religious views.
Traditionalists, who view historical institutions as essential to achieving the
proper practice of Islam, may prefer orthodoxy and stability to a representative
state, if forced to choose. The republican Islamic tradition holds, by contrast,
that individuals may achieve religious virtue through their own study of the basic
sources of Islam; this religious view permits religious heterodoxy, if necessary, to
ensure a representative form of government. The latter roughly corresponds to
the Muslim Brotherhood and the former to the architects of the 2013 military
coup that ousted the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood. Fadel’s article
reminds us of the continued significance of comparative constitutional law to the
ongoing process of constitution drafting, which today has particular salience in
North Africa and the Middle East.
In her contribution to this Symposium, Vanessa MacDonnell takes on
“quasi-constitutional legislation,”1 a long-standing but poorly understood
category of statutes in Canada. As in the other contributions, MacDonnell
focuses on aspects of constitutionalism that are overlooked by comparative
constitutional texts. Drawing on German, American, Canadian, and UK
sources, she argues for a broad understanding of quasi-constitutional legislation,
defining it as “legislation that implements constitutional imperatives.”2 The
term “constitutional imperatives” means constitutional obligations of “varying
degrees of specificity.”3 The article defends this definition against those offered
by other scholars and against the objection that it is too broad. MacDonnell’s
definition implies that many statutes would have quasi-constitutional status and
that they may come into conflict with each other. She argues that courts should
attempt to avoid conflicts through interpretation and that, to the extent possible,
conflicts should be resolved by the political branches. The article illustrates the
complex layers of entrenchment possible in modern constitutional systems.
1.
2.
3.

Vanessa MacDonnell, “A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation”
(2016) 53:2 OHLJ 508.
Ibid, at 512.
Ibid, at 511.
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Entrenchment is often considered an essential aspect of constitutional norms,
but as constitutional systems mature, courts and political actors tend to entrench
norms through different means than constitutional texts and with different
possibilities of amendment and change—a theme of Albert’s work as well.
The field of comparative constitutional law is fortunate to have the excellent
collection of articles brought together in this volume of the Osgoode
Hall Law Journal.

